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TORTS - EFFECT OF A'ITRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE ON MUNICIPAL
LIABILITY TO CHILDREN ON THE STREETS - Plaintiff, an eight year old girl,
stopped on the way home with a playmate to play around a newspaper stand
located on the edge of the sidewalk. The stand was maintained by a vendor who
was licensed by the city. While the plaintiff was standing beside the stand, her
playmate swung from the top, causing it to topple over on the plaintiff and gash
her forehead. Despite medical care infection set in and a disfiguring scar resulted. There was evidence that the stand had fallen over previously for various
reasons. Held, that the defendant city was negligent in not using reasonable care
to protect children from a dangerous agency which it should have known would
attract children from a place where they had a right to be. The city had also
breached its duty to keep the street free from obstructions. Harrison v. City of
Chicago, 308 Ill. App. 263, 31 N. E. (2d) 359 (1941).
Generally, a landowner owes no duty to a trespasser except to avoid wilfully
harming him.1 However, concern for the welfare and safety of children has led
to development of the attractive nuisance doctrine, which makes a landowner
liable for the injuries of a child who is actually a trespasser when the circumstances are such that the landowner can reasonably expect children to be on his

1 20

R. C. L. 79 (1918).
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land and playing with a dangerous object which he has placed there. 2 Numerous
theories and .fictions have been presented to justify raising a duty to a child
where none would exist if the trespasser were an adult. 8 From the early cases
involving railroads,4 the doctrine has been extended to impose liability on other
private landowners, 5 and the doctrine has been used to permit recovery by children who are injured while in a place where they have a full right to be, as in
the principal case. 6 In these latter cases, a common-law duty to protect the child
exists independent of the attractive nuisance doctrine, and the doctrine is used
not to create the duty, but apparently to prove the breach of duty. The question
naturally arises whether the application of the attractive nuisance doctrine to
this class of cases in any way enlarges the liability of the landowner as to infant
invitees. At common law, municipalities have a duty to use reasonable care to
make highways safe for ordinary use.7 Children at play, certainly when the play
is merely incidental to travel, are making a proper use of the highway. 8
To ful.fill this duty to the child the city must exercise greater care than is necessary to protect an adult. 9 The fundamental duty, however, lies toward the
individual regardless of his age, and only the degree of care that must be exercised to ful.fill the duty, not the raising of the duty itself, is dependent upon the
36 A. L. R. 37 at 38 (1925) ~ 39 AJ L. R. 486 (1925); 45 A. L. R. 982
Numerous citations show the status of the doctrine in the various states.
8
Some of the explanations are: natural consequences are intended; failure to take
precaution is equivalent to wanton injury; attractive dangerous object constitutes a trap;
"sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas"; attraction amounts to an invitation; a child
of tender years cannot be a trespasser; or one must take reasonable precautions to avoid
reasonably anticipated injury. 36 A. L. R. 37 at 109 (1925).
~ Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. (84 U. S.) 657 (1873); Union Pacific R. R.
v. McDonald, 152 U. S. 262, 14 S. Ct. 619 (1894).
5
Edwards v. Negley, 193 ill. App. 426 (1914); Brinkley Car Co. v. Cooper, 60
Ark. 545, 31 S. W. 154 (1895); Bransom's Admr. v. Labrot, 81 Ky. 638 (1884).
6
Schmidt v. Cook, 12 Misc. 449, 33 N. Y. S. 624 (1895). Also, it should be
noted that other jurisdictions get results consistent with this theory, but on somewhat
different reasoning. In Michigan, for instance, while the true attactive nuisance doctrine is not accepted in full, a modification of the doctrine has been used which would
apparently allow recovery on facts similar to those of the principal case. See LeDuc v.
Detroit Edison Co., 254 Mich. 86 at 91, 235 N. W. 832 (1931), where the court
reviewed the cases and laid down this rule: "Where the child is where he has a right
to be, as in the street or as a licensee on private premises, and his trespass is technical
rather than wilful, i.e., consists of playing with or taking the property of another as
the spontaneous and natural act of an irresponsible child immediately attracted to the
object, recovery is not barred by the trespass."
7
WHITE, NEGLIGENCE OF MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONs, § 243 (1920); Smith
v. Davis, 22 App. D. C. 298 (1903); Board of Councilmen of City of Frankfort v.
Allen, 26 Ky. L. R. 581, 82 S. W. 292 (1904).
8
WHITE, NEGLIGENCE OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 292 (1920); Gulline
v. Lowell, 144 Mass. 491, II N. E. 723 (1887); Irvine v. Town of Greenwood, 89
S. C. 511, 72 S. E. 228 (1911). Statutes raising a duty only to travellers are sometimes held not to protect children using highways solely as a playground. 22 L. R. A.
561 (1894).
9
20 R. C. L. 79 (1918); Lynch v. Smith, 104 Mass. 52 (1870); Gnau v.
Ackerman, 166 Ky. 258, 179 S. W. 217 (1915).
2
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plaintiff's age.10 Of course in these cases the degree of care imposed upon the
municipality as to travellers is of necessity limited to some extent by virtue of the
coexisting duty in the municipality to furnish adequate transportation facilities.11
Under the attractive nuisance doctrine, the right of the plaintiff to be on the
premises is assumed because of an artificial structure which the jury finds to be
so tempting to children that their presence there may be reasonably anticipated.12
If the jury finds such a structure, it then decides whether reasonable care has
been used in view of the fact that children were expected or invited to play
there.13 The logical difference between the two approaches in these cases is
that the attractive nuisance doctrine uses a fiction to create a duty which already
exists. However, the application of the two doctrines would not seem always
to impose the same burden upon the municipality. Under the ordinary duty
theory, the question placed before the jury is whether the city exercised reasonable care in the maintenance of its roads to protect the children; in the attractive
nuisance cases, whether the city used reasonable care to protect children after
it had invited or tempted them to the scene of the attraction. As the principal
case demonstrates, the use of hindsight or a res ipsa loquitur test by the jury is
likely to result in a holding that the object was attrative and not reasonably
guarded whenever it has attracted and injured a child. Thus, although authoritative statements of the doctrine categorically deny that a landowner is liable as
an insurer,14 such liability is frequently the result.15 It seems questionable
whether such a heavy responsibility should be placed upon the city rather than
upon the parents of the child. '
Donald H. Treadwell

10 The immaturity of the plaintiff would also lessen his responsibility for contributing negligent acts. Lynch v. Smith, 104 Mass. 52 (1870); Reed v. City of
Madison, 83 Wis. 171, 53 N. W. 547 (1892).
11-Irvine v. Town of Greenwood, 89 S. C. 5u, 72 S. E. 228 (19n).
12 Peters v. Bowman, II5 Cal. 345, 47 P. II3, 598 (1896); Gandy v. Copeland,
204 Ala. 366, 86 So. 3 (1920). In Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Ray, 124 Tenn.
16, 134 S. W. 858 (1910), the court said that in the Tennessee cases the courts had
in some way controlled the cases in which the doctrine was applied.
18 Peters v. Bowman, 115 Cal. 345, 47 P. II3, 598 (1896); McMillin's Admr.
v. Bourbon Stock Yards Co., 179 Ky. 140, 200 S. W. 328 (1918). In Union Light,
Heat & Power Co. v. Lunsford, 189 Ky. 785,225 S. W. 741 (1920), it was said that
care commensurate with the danger involved must be used.
14 22 L. R. A. 561 (1894); 36 A. L. R. 37 at 123 (1925).
15 Smith, "Liability of Landowners to Children Entering without Permission,"
II HARV. L. REV. 349 (1898).

